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Durant l’entre-deux-guerres, l’industrie britannique privée de l’armement 
naval comprenait une poignée de grandes entreprises. Leur relation avec 
l’Etat britannique est importante pour les historiens : en effet, le désar-
mement avait diminué la capacité de l’industrie à répondre aux besoins 
d’une expansion navale rapide, créant en retour des difficultés considé-
rables pour les planificateurs de guerre. Cet article présente de nouvelles 
données sur la collusion des prix au sein des entreprises navales, et 
montre comment l’industrie privée a réagi aux défis du désarmement, 
avant de chercher à profiter du réarmement. Il met en évidence le fait 
que l’amirauté n’avait pas reçu, de la part du Cabinet et du Trésor, les 
moyens de préserver les capacités de l’industrie, et que, en conséquence, 
et malgré la conspiration pour le profit, la formation d’un cartel, actif de 
1926 à 1941, a probablement sauvé les gouvernements de l’entre-deux-
guerres de leurs propres erreurs.
1 ‘Admiralty Contracts, Prevention of Profiteering’ 17 July 1936, Templewood Papers, Cambridge University 
Library [Hereafter CUL], MS Templewood Part 9, File 5.
2 Jubb to Piggot, 16 November 1940, Glasgow University Archives Service [Hereafter GUAS], UCS1/21/17.
In July 1936 as Britain’s rearmament 
drive was gathering momentum, E.C. Jubb, 
the Admiralty’s Director of Navy Contracts, 
remarked that his organisation’s system of 
competitive tendering whereby specialised 
firms would be invited to secretly bid for the 
right to build a naval vessel was “one of the 
greatest safeguards against undue profits” in 
any branch of military procurement1. Yet, 
four years later, he was forced to request 
that directors at John Brown’s shipyard near 
Glasgow “reconsider the amount quoted [for 
a 9 000 ton Roberts-class Monitor]…with a 
view to a very substantial reduction being 
made” when the Admiralty belatedly discov-
ered that even the lowest bids were yielding 
unprecedented profits2. As his organisation 
was beginning to realise, what had transpired 
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across the preceding fifteen years was a 
prolonged and sophisticated price-collusion 
between warship builders. This collusion 
had completely circumvented competitive 
tendering during rearmament and raked in 
huge sums of money for some of Britain’s 
largest armament businesses, firms which 
had been fighting for their very existence 
only a few years earlier.
Concurrent with the development of a 
warshipbuilding cartel was the growth in 
both size and influence of the British govern-
ment’s defence planning organisation, the 
Committee for Imperial Defence (CID). 
What had begun life as a single advisory 
body comprising a handful of individuals in 
1902 from the Admiralty, Army (and later 
Royal Air Force) was by 1939 a gargantuan 
operation comprising dozens of subcommit-
tees and several hundred staff meetings, on 
average, almost twice a day3. Within the CID 
was a sub-group devoted entirely to supply 
and procurement, known as the Principal 
Supply Officers Committee (PSOC). Dating 
from the mid-1920s, the PSOC had by 1935 
grown to become the single most important 
force in the conceptualisation and organ-
isation of all of British material defence 
needs, from boots to bombs and battleships. 
Nevertheless, the cartel persisted.
Despite a wealth of scholarship on the 
interwar period and rearmament policy, this 
is a relatively unknown and under-researched 
area. Valuable contributions to the areas of 
naval (and industrial) decline have been made 
and re-made in recent years, while themes of 
appeasement, rearmament and constraints on 
policy have been a topic of debate almost 
continuously since the 1930s4. Yet, studies 
of the behaviour of the armaments industry, 
and specifically how it reacted to matters of 
3 F. A. Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1960, p. 221.
4 See, for example: W. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume 1: The Gathering Storm, London, Cassell, 1948.
5 C. Trebilcock, “Science, Technology and the Armaments Industry in the UK and Europe, With Special Reference 
to the Period 1880-1914”, Journal of European Economic History, 22 (3), 1993, p. 569-570.
disarmament and rearmament remain absent. 
One can speculate why this lacuna exists: 
rearmament and disarmament are often 
treated as separate entities emanating from 
top-level policymaking, so an examination of 
how (and why) industry responded to these 
changes is often an afterthought in studies of, 
among other things, the policies of interwar 
governments. By the same token, business 
history, military (or naval) history, and polit-
ical history do not always neatly overlap; 
historians of war have tended to show little 
interest in the business decisions behind tank, 
fighter or warship production. Similarly, 
business historians are only superficially 
concerned with what these governments then 
did with the weapons bought.
Nevertheless, the political economy 
of armaments manufacture should interest 
business historians, for it sheds light on the 
pathways to success and failure for several 
of Britain’s largest armament firms and 
helps our understanding of how and when 
businesses or businessmen could exert influ-
ence upon events ordinarily well outside 
their realm of influence. Naval armaments 
are a particularly good case to study in this 
regard: unlike makers of aircraft or tanks, 
naval manufacturers were large and well-es-
tablished firms which either long predated 
World War I or grew rapidly during it. In 
1939, naval weaponry remained amongst 
the most sophisticated and expensive tech-
nology on the planet. Indeed, one historian 
has characterised the technological capa-
bility for making a revolving battleship gun 
turret in World War I as about as rare as the 
ability to make spacecraft seventy years later; 
though the experience of the interwar years 
meant firms meeting this requirement actu-
ally became, if anything, rarer by 19395.
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Secondly, though cartels were relatively 
common in the 1920s and 1930s, naval arma-
ments stand alone. While many national 
governments of the time saw cartels as a 
way of eliminating excess competition and 
regulating the market (in terms of quality 
and price), for the reasons outlined below, 
warship building was an entirely different 
beast. In this case the British government 
had no knowledge of its existence, and 
politically the government was averse to 
ordering warships from foreign shipyards. 
Since technological barriers for entry to 
the warship sector for domestic shipyards 
were eye-wateringly high and no guarantees 
of orders from the Admiralty – especially 
during disarmament – existed, this ’ring’ of 
shipbuilders could operate in a way that the 
coal, textile and even merchant shipbuilding 
industries could not6.
This article proceeds chronologically. 
Part I explains the experience of industry 
and the development of the CID until 1932, 
including the first attempts to assist industry. 
Part II explains the changes that occurred 
both in the political circumstances and the 
organisational structures between then and 
1935. Part III then outlines the results of price 
fixing and the failure of effective supply 
planning during the period of rearmament 
between 1936 and the early years of the war 
itself, before Part IV makes some general 
conclusions about the nature of the cartel and 
its impact upon British defence preparation 
more generally.
6 J. Fear, “Cartels”, in G. Jones and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Business History, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. 273-277.
7 A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding 1500-2010: A History, Lancaster, Carnegie, 2013, p. 66.
8 In 1926, these firms – which all predated the war – were Vickers, Armstrong-Whitworth, Palmer, Hawthorn 
Leslie, Swan-Hunter (based in the North East of England); John Brown, Fairfield, Beardmore, Scott, Stephen, Yarrow 
(on the Clyde), Cammell Laird (of Birkenhead), White (East Cowes), and Thornycroft (Hampshire).
9 A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding, op. cit., p. 67.
10 E. H. W. Tennyson D’Eyncourt, A Shipbuilder’s Yarn: the Record of a Naval Constructor, London, Hutchinson, 
1948, p. 129-141.
11 Ibid.
1. THE EXPERIENCE  
OF INDUSTRY  
AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE CID UNTIL 1932
During the First World War, the British 
naval arms industry worked at full capacity to 
enlarge the Royal Naval fleet to record levels. 
The private yards (excluding Admiralty-
owned Royal Dockyards) produced over 
1,5 million tons of naval vessels between 
1914 and 1919, equivalent to over 800 ships 
for the Admiralty7. Moreover, the expertise 
and facilities required to build or repair a 
warship vastly outstripped that of passenger 
or merchant vessels, leaving only fifteen8 or 
so capable of undertaking complex naval 
work. The pace of wartime construction was 
so great that most rapidly expanded their 
capacities, adding new berths, cranes, and 
yard space9. The need for efficiency meant 
industry developed an increasingly close rela-
tionship with the navy: staff moved between 
Admiralty and private work frequently, 
shared ideas, and built trust in each other10. 
Moreover, the Admiralty (and public) firmly 
believed that British built ships were the 
world’s best, and placed a great deal of faith 
in their relationship with the major naval 
firms, most of which were famous names in 
the industrial heartlands of Britain11.
The story of industrial co-operation on 
defence was fostered on a broader scale 
during the war with the Ministry of Munitions. 
This ministry, with David Lloyd George as 
its first head, was separate from the CID 
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and hastily created to solve the shortage of 
explosive ammunition in 1915 (the so-called 
’Shell Crisis’). It soon expanded its remit and 
worked closely with private industry to alle-
viate the bottlenecks in production. Indeed, 
Lloyd George was an enthusiastic advocate 
of a state-industry partnership. He remarked 
that the Ministry should be ’from first to 
last a business-man organisation’, and that 
he intended to “utilis[e], as far as possible, 
the business brains of the community… 
some of them at my elbow… to advise, to 
counsel, to guide, to inform, to instruct, and 
to direct”12. Within a matter of months he 
had appointed a number of senior industri-
alists (including the shipbuilder Sir James 
Lithgow) to leading roles in every depart-
ment, undertaken construction of new shell 
factories, turned civilian production over to 
wartime material, and helped propel himself 
towards the office of Prime Minister, which 
he took up in 191613. Perhaps not surprisingly 
though, the wartime ministry was found to be 
redundant in peacetime, and soon abolished.
It was one of Lloyd George’s senior 
business figures, Lord Weir, who helped 
point the way forward in peace. Weir, 
whose engineering firm made pumps for 
warship engines, had first been appointed 
Director of Munitions in Scotland during 
World War I, was recalled to investigate the 
’Supply of Munitions and Armaments in a 
Future War’ in 1922, though his main task 
was to report on the potential amalgamation 
of services common to the Navy, Army and 
Air Force14. Weir’s report argued against any 
centralised ’Ministry of Defence’ and instead 
recommended a committee comprised of 
members from the Army, Navy and RAF 
12 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Volume I, London, Odhams, 1933, p. 148-149.
13 Ibid.
14 ‘Supply of Munitions etc.’, memo by Maurice Hankey, Contracts Coordinating Committee, 28 January 1921, 
TNA, CAB15/20.
15 F. A. Johnson, Defense by Committee, op. cit., p. 176.
16 L. Johnman and H. Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2002, 
p. 19.
to coordinate supply15. Two later reports 
supported Weir’s conclusions, and in 1924 
Cabinet agreed to create the Principal Supply 
Officers’ Committee (PSOC) within the CID 
which later became responsible for the task 
of identifying defensive deficiencies and then 
organising rearmament in the 1930s. Though 
comprising a membership of senior military 
technical experts, it retained only advisory 
powers: when production problems were 
identified, Cabinet had to authorise their 
rectification. This arrangement persisted 
across the interwar years.
Though the roots of industrial co-op-
eration and the growth of supply planning 
bodies are in World War I, the background 
to the CID’s collaboration with business 
leaders and the cartelisation of industry can 
be drawn directly to the period of disarma-
ment following the Washington Naval Treaty 
of 1922. In the aftermath of war, political 
pressure to disarm – or at least avoid an 
expensive arms race with America – coupled 
with the possession of a large and young 
fleet left naval construction a low priority. 
Washington therefore set out strict tonnage 
limits for the world’s major naval powers and 
imposed a ten-year ’holiday’ on battleship 
construction, resulting in an almost over-
night cancellation of millions of pounds of 
contracts16. Of course, naval shipbuilders 
had fully expected some tapering off of 
naval construction in peacetime. But while 
cyclical trends in demands for merchant 
and passenger ships were nothing new, 
the severity of the Washington restrictions 
surprised most. The naval budget was cut 
from £81m in 1921 to £56m the following 
year, and would not rise above £60m again 
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until 193517. Moreover, following an initial 
‘boom’ through replacing ships lost to the 
war and the re-opening of markets and trade 
routes, demand stagnated from 1921, leaving 
a worldwide oversupply of cargo tonnage 
that persisted throughout the decade18.
Thus, naval armaments manufacturers 
were forced to compete at increasingly 
cutthroat levels for contracts of any kind. 
A cargo ship priced at £250 000 in 1920 
was on offer at less than £60 000 in 1926, 
leading to substantial losses on the rationale 
that this was better than no contract at all19. 
Some firms also responded by diversifying 
their portfolios: Beardmore turned over its 
engineering plant to diesel engines for trucks, 
experimented with aircraft, and moved into 
locomotive manufacture. However, while 
Cammell Laird’s work on rolling stock 
yielded positive results, Beardmore was 
amongst the first of the major naval firms to 
collapse in 1930.
Others fared little better in the 1920s. 
Armstrong-Whitworth and Vickers merged 
in 1927 to form Vickers-Armstrong, though 
in reality it was Vickers, the largest and most 
successful armaments manufacturer of its 
day, swallowing its rival on favourable terms. 
Still, at least it had a future. The Coventry 
Ordnance Works, an important manufacturer 
of naval guns, collapsed in 1925. By the end 
of 1929, shipbuilding unemployment was 
up ten-fold since 1919, to 40 %20. Despite 
this slimming down of the sector chronic 
overcapacity persisted into the 1930s. The 
extra warship berths allowed 1,8m tons of 
naval vessels to be launched between 1914 
and 1919. In contrast, 1930 to 1934 saw 
17 B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988; R.P. Shay, British 
Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 297.
18 L. Johnman and H. Murphy, British Shipbuilding, op. cit., Table 3; A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding, op. cit., p. 85.
19 A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding op. cit., p. 72.
20 L. Johnman and H. Murphy, British Shipbuilding, op. cit., Table 3.
21 Derived from A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding, op. cit., p. 63; L. Johnman and H. Murphy, British Shipbuilding, 
op. cit., Table 5.
22 Sir Alexander Kennedy, speech at launch of Taranaki, Glasgow Herald, 12 December 1926.
just 50 000 tons launched, or less than 3 % 
of the wartime level. While the war was, of 
course, atypical of ’normal’ levels of warship 
construction, disarmament was terrible by 
any standards for private manufacturers: 
tonnage launched was barely a quarter, even, 
of the previous low watermark in the 1890s21. 
Sir Alexander Kennedy, the Chairman of 
Fairfield shipbuilding company, summed up 
the mood of firms when he noted despond-
ently in a speech: “…today private firms 
[find] themselves burdened with resources 
and equipment capable of meeting naval 
requirements far beyond any programme 
that might for some years to come – if not 
for ever – likely to be laid down”22.
Nevertheless, governments showed little 
interest in assisting warshipbuilders. There 
was no public appetite in the aftermath of 
war for any increase in naval expenditure 
(which would in any case have contravened 
the Washington agreement). Even had such 
enthusiasm existed, Britain’s finances were 
in no fit state to divert funding to the fleet: a 
third of government spending in the decade 
to 1929 was swallowed by servicing the war 
debt alone. The Admiralty, for its part, had 
realised the potential gravity of the situation 
even before the Washington conference: The 
First Lord of the Admiralty, David Beatty, 
warned that “specially skilled labour, accus-
tomed to special warship work, is being 
dispersed [and] the longer warship construc-
tion is put off, the more difficult it will be to 
find suitable labour”, while “the total cessa-
tion of [naval] construction would involve us 
in a serious deficiency of trained shipbuilding 
staff and mechanics” was the prediction of 
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Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt, the Director 
of Naval Construction from 1912 to 192423.
While overcapacity in berths and slip-
ways was widespread, the same was not true 
for specialist facilities for guns and armour, 
though these were still at risk if a shipyard 
collapsed24. Nevertheless, Admiralty-led 
schemes until 1926 to preserve plant and 
facilities were either rejected or heavily modi-
fied by the Treasury. The first in 1924 aimed 
to provide a steady stream of work within the 
terms of the Washington Treaty via an annual 
support fund of £5m paid for by an increase 
to the navy estimates. The Treasury revised 
it down to £1,5m and refused to renew it in 
later years25. An attempt to guarantee loans 
to shipyards to allow the undertaking of 
contracts before payment lasted only a little 
longer, and was terminated in 192626. By 
this point the business position was acute; 
Coventry Ordnance Works had closed alto-
gether; Beardmore, Scott and Yarrow had 
completely run out of profitable work, naval 
or otherwise, and Palmer fared little better27. 
As such the Admiralty resorted to bending 
the rules without notifying the Treasury 
or CID. The Controller of the Navy, Ernle 
Chatfield, spearheaded an agreement in 1925 
over armour which essentially agreed to pay 
a higher price for small orders – a subsidy via 
a cost premium – to keep idle plant operating. 
He went to great lengths to be secretive, 
coloured by the experience of two failed 
assistance schemes, and so only informed the 
PSOC of it in guarded terms once agreement 
had been reached with the manufacturers28. 
23 G. A. H. Gordon, British Sea Power and Procurement Between Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament, Hong 
Kong, Naval Institute, 1988, p.76-77.
24 M. M. Postan, British War Production (History of the Second World War), London, HMSO, 1952, p. 48; G. A. 
H. Gordon, British Sea Power, op. cit., p.86-87; 24th Meeting of the Supply Board, 11 October 1932, TNA, CAB 
60/30.
25 ‘Minutes of Meeting of the Admiralty Board’, paper 1813, 18th February 1924, TNA, ADM167/69.
26 G. A. H. Gordon, British Seapower, op. cit., p. 77.
27 H. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde, Edinburgh, John Donald, 1987, p. 111-112.
28 ‘24th Meeting of the Principal Supply Officers Committee’, PSO 24th Mtg., 25 February 1926, TNA, CAB60/2.
29 G. A. H. Gordon, British Seapower, op. cit., p. 84.
30 F. E. McMurtie (ed.), Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II, London, Random House, 1997, p. 38-39.
Indeed, when the Auditor-General found out 
the following year, the Treasury immediately 
protested, and after a payment of £60 000 was 
made despite no armour being ordered at all 
in 1929, the scheme collapsed29.
Though the armour scheme lasted a little 
longer than the others (perhaps because it 
cost so little), Treasury control was clear. 
The famous ‘Cruiser Crisis’, where the 
Admiralty sought to exploit a loophole in 
the Washington agreement to increase the 
naval budget for new cruisers, once more 
brought the two sides into furious confron-
tation. It was only after threats of Admiralty 
resignations that the Prime Minister, Stanley 
Baldwin, sought a compromise of a modest 
increase in the naval budget (of £3m on top of 
the £55m agreed for 1925). This was however 
on condition of a reduction in overheads else-
where, meaning the majority of work was 
placed in the idle Royal Dockyards, and 
mostly defeated the point of the exercise30 .
As a result, the years between 1926 and 
1933 saw the naval armaments industry take 
the radical step of secretly clubbing together 
in the interests of self-preservation, a step 
which would underpin future co-operation 
and lead to widespread price-fixing at the 
Exchequer’s expense. Essentially, a ‘rota’ 
whereby the major warship yards spread 
available orders, initially only for small 
destroyers, between the fifteen firms was 
devised. Commencing in 1926, this rela-
tively simple step avoided the undesirable 
effects of cutthroat competition among 
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member firms. Destroyer contracts had the 
advantage of being both relatively inex-
pensive and commonplace, even during 
disarmament, allowing for an even share to 
keep men employed and facilities in use. In 
addition, uniform designs across large classes 
meant that any price escalation would have 
been readily apparent to the Admiralty and 
Treasury, which perhaps explains why costs 
remained steady during the disarmament 
years31.
Any announcement that strictly compet-
itive tendering, supposedly delivering best 
value to the taxpayer, had been abandoned 
would have been anathema to the Treasury 
and scuppered the whole scheme. As such, 
it remained private. The firms – known as 
the Warshipbuilders’ Committee (WSBC) 
– enlisted the assistance of the Shipbuilding 
Employers’ Federation (SEF) to coordinate 
meetings centrally and corresponded exclu-
sively at the chairman or managing director 
level to minimise leaks32. The members met 
for the first time in February 1926. The SEF 
controller from 1923, former shipbuilder and 
industrialist John Barr, was to be responsible 
for the lines of communication between the 
WSBC yards – a position he held contin-
uously (though occasionally deputised 
by Captain T.E. Crease, who eventually 
succeeded him) until 1937.
The WSBC was a powerful group, 
even in the context of the 1920s when its 
members were at their weakest. No other 
firms in Britain could meet the demands of 
constructing a complex warship or had any 
experience of Admiralty work. Furthermore, 
it was widely accepted that it was politically 
31 Profits on the contracts remained low, in some cases, yards still made small losses. Fairfield, for instance, lost 
£1,375 on a destroyer order, while Brown in Clydebank lost almost £10,000 on a contract for two from the same 
class. H. Peebles, Warshipbuilding, op. cit., p. 111.
32 Personal correspondence between members of the committee survives, but it was never officially mentioned at 
company level with other members of the board. See for example, the directors’ minutes of Fairfield (Glasgow City 
Council Archives [hereafter GCC], UCS2/1/2), the directors’ minutes of Vickers Armstrong (CUL, MS Vickers), 
and the directors’ minutes of John Brown Clydebank (GUAS, UCS1/5/6).
33 C. M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars, London, Macmillan, 2000, p. 149-157.
34 ’Meeting at Hotel Cecil – Hull and Machinery for Admiralty Contracts’ 19 December 1926, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
impossible – given the precarious position 
but also world-leading reputation of British 
shipbuilding and the degree of technical 
secrecy involved – for the Admiralty to place 
an order abroad even if it was technically 
feasible or financially more prudent. Instead, 
the aim was to assist British firms in winning 
orders from foreign navies33.
However, though secretive, the initial 
rota was unsophisticated. In its first guise 
it simply involved drawing names from a 
hat (Beardmore, Hawthorn Leslie, Palmers, 
Fairfield, Cammell Laird and Vickers were 
the first out). Nor did the profit margin 
involve much in the way of complex calcu-
lation – some 10 % of the costs were to be 
added to the final bids34. Though undoubt-
edly helpful, by the end of the decade this 
rota had outgrown its modest ambitions and 
was replaced with a much further reaching 
scheme. The reasons why closer coopera-
tion occurred are not absolutely clear from 
surviving evidence, though the political situ-
ation in 1929 (with a broadly pacifist Labour 
government pledging to cut armaments 
spending back further) and the subsequent 
Wall Street crash stand as two of the most 
obvious threats to the industry. It is however 
clear that from this point the rota involved 
almost all kinds of ships (and parts thereof), 
and a much greater degree of price fixing.
This enhanced process worked in 
basically the same way until 1941. Upon 
receiving invitation from the Director of 
Navy Contracts, each firm wrote to Barr 
notifying him of the Admiralty’s intention 
to place an order. To quote from a typical 
example, James Brown at Scott “begged to 
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advise the committee” that his company had 
“received the usual enquiry for the construc-
tion and completion in all respects of Hull 
and Machinery of one and each of the two 
destroyers for H.M. Navy”, detailed the dead-
line for Admiralty receipt of the tender, and 
the Admiralty’s instruction that it was strictly 
confidential35. Barr (or Crease) collected such 
notifications together, occasionally writing 
to firms which had failed to send word to 
confirm that they had, in fact, been invited 
to tender36. This allowed Barr to confirm 
that the tenders were being invited from all 
eligible firms, in other words ensuring the 
process was being run in the usual way, and 
to level the playing field by alerting yards to 
tenders not yet received, maximising the time 
available to prepare cost estimates. It also 
allowed the committee to reaffirm the belief 
that no yard was being excluded on a price 
or quality basis, and thus continue to design 
rotas for tenders at prices that would allow 
reasonable profits to be returned.
With tenders received, Barr’s next task 
was to ascertain which yards were interested 
in ‘winning’ the contract. In the disarmament 
years this included practically every firm 
able to undertake the order, while during 
rearmament increased merchant demand 
meant it was commonplace for several 
to notify Barr that they did not wish to be 
considered. The same process was followed: 
firms would notify Barr of their intent to 
bid, following which representatives from 
each would attend a meeting. Here, the most 
accurate cost figures available would be 
discussed openly so that the group knew, to 
the pound, what each firm believed it would 
cost them to produce the vessel required by 
the Admiralty37. Such information was then 
compiled into lists and duly circulated, so that 
35 For example, see Brown to Barr, 13 October 1933 or Brown to Crease, 18 November 1935, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
36 Barr to Alexander, 6 December 1933, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
37 ‘Estimates’, undated, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
38 Letter from Yarrow to Brown, 28 January 1929, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
39 Crease to Brown, 29 October 1930, GUAS: GD319 12/7/6.
each committee member had a written record 
of its own costs relative to those of others in 
the group. In rarer but not necessarily infre-
quent cases, particularly when meetings had 
been called at short notice and thus detailed 
estimates were not yet available, firms wrote 
to each other to provide costs. To give one 
example, in 1929 Sir Harold E. Yarrow, 
managing director of the shipbuilders of the 
same name, wrote to James Brown at Scott 
giving him a full and exact breakdown of 
their estimated costs for a destroyer leader, 
a destroyer, and a depot ship38.
Rival businesses sharing information on 
prices in a period where there were very few 
orders to go round contained a great deal 
of risk. That they did so is testament to the 
effectiveness of the scheme, and the incen-
tives to stay in. Any shipyard outside the 
group would have certainly faced significant 
challenges. Without knowing how low the 
‘winning’ bid was, a competitor would have 
been forced to undercut rivals, and would in 
all likelihood been faced with the return to 
the cutthroat and loss-making bids in order to 
gain contracts. It is therefore not surprising 
that from the committee’s earliest days until 
well into the Second World War the member-
ship remained remarkably stable.
When a firm did pose a threat to the 
stability of the cartel, the WSBC acted. In 
October 1930, the SEF were informed that 
Harland and Wolff (H&W) of Belfast were 
also being invited to tender for Admiralty 
contracts for an upcoming cruiser class, 
information that was immediately circu-
lated39. H&W, though not a frequent supplier 
to the Admiralty, did have some past naval 
experience with complex vessels during 
World War I, with the construction of the 
large cruiser HMS Glorious. Thus, it was 
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one of the few ‘outsiders’ with facilities 
capable of handling such vessels40. When 
the SEF notified James Brown, he argued 
for their inclusion within the group, noting 
“they [H&W] are not parties to the current 
arrangement and must be brought in some-
how”41. Other members evidently agreed. 
Craven from Vickers and Batey from 
Hawthorn Leslie joined Crease and met 
the Chief Executive of Harland and Wolff, 
Frederick Rebbeck, on 12 November 1930 to 
put across their proposals for joining the rota, 
and “emphasised the necessity for discre-
tion and absolute secrecy”42. H&W, clearly 
taken by the offer, agreed to the terms on the 
following day, and were formally admitted to 
the group at a meeting two weeks later. The 
entire process from notification to admission 
had taken less than a month.
Secrecy was also heightened around the 
same time. The firms took to giving each 
other codenames, though these were rudi-
mentary and unlikely to pass any serious 
scrutiny. Stephen’s on the Clyde was coded 
as ‘CONE’ (meaning, one presumes, Clyde 
one), Scott as ‘CETU’, while others were 
grouped under similar letters and numbers 
for geographical locations43. Nevertheless, 
the scheme was evidently working well, for 
profits returned to naval work – even during 
a time of scarce orders – long before other 
shipbuilding sectors. At Brown, compared 
with a loss on the two ‘Class’ destroyers, 
the two ‘F-Class’ contracts from four years 
later netted them an extra £87 00044, a marked 
improvement from the situation from 1922-
1928, where 23 orders in total netted the 
40 I. Buxton and I. Johnston, The Battleship Builders: Constructing and Arming British Capital Ships, Annapolis 
(Md.), US Naval Institute Press, 2013, p. 84.
41 Crease to Brown, 29 October 1930, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
42 Crease to Brown, 14 November 1930, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
43 ‘SECRET: Minutes of Private Arrangement made by letter concerning Minespools 32’. GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
44 A. Slaven, “A Shipyard in Depression: John Browns of Clydebank 1919–1938”, Business History, vol. 19, n° 2, 
July 1977, p. 198.
45 Ibid.
46 H. Peebles, Warshipbuilding, op. cit., p. 110.
47 ‘Machinery for HMS Warspite’, GUAS: GD319 12/7/6.
company a combined loss of £211 00045. At 
Fairfield, a single small loss of £1 375 on a 
naval machinery contract was an exception 
rather than the rule, compared with twelve 
out of fifteen merchant orders in the same 
period which failed to cover costs46.
The effectiveness of price fixing in the 
period prior to rearmament is well illustrated 
with the bid to refit HMS Warspite with new 
machinery. As already noted, estimates were 
prepared in an entirely standard way; firms 
submitted to Barr what were ostensibly 
honest prices for fulfilling the contract. At 
the subsequent meeting, however, costs were 
openly shared with all interested parties. The 
estimates were then averaged out across all 
firms intending to bid, before a final price to 
be quoted was agreed upon (see table below). 
It is notable that the firm providing the lowest 
estimate, John Brown, was instructed to 
‘lose’ the tender by entering a bid higher than 
Parsons, the eventual ‘winner’. Secondly, 
despite having organised which firm was to 
receive the contract, the others did not simply 
withdraw from the process, but instead 
submitted higher quotations to give a false 
impression of a genuine bid (indeed, in the 
handwritten notes at the side of the chart the 
term ‘add hundreds’ is present, presumably 
because the rounded figures might have 
aroused suspicion). The third point is that 
exactly 10 % was added onto the mean of 
estimates, and rounded to the nearest hundred 
(the exact figure is £448 712), which was the 
amount quoted for the winning bid47. Such 
averaging perhaps kept prices competitive: 
if it was simply a case of 10 % being added 
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to the price of whichever firm was next in the 
rota, then the ‘winning’ bid could have been 
as high as £506 880 (if based on Cammell 
Laird’s estimate), which may have appeared 
a suspiciously high price to the Admiralty or 
Treasury in the early 1930s.
Firm Estimate Price to be quoted
Parsons* £405 000 £448 700
Brown £387 600 £459 000
Scott £406 300 £472 000
Cammell Laird £460 800 £480 000
Wallsend* £402 000 £467 000
Fairfield £388 500 £463 000
Vickers £408 000 £471 000
Hawthorn Leslie £405200 £465 000
Mean of estimates £407 920
*Engine manufacturer only
Source: Machinery for HMS ‘Warspite’ (Secret), GUAS, UGD GD319 12/7/5
The reasons for the success of this 
scheme are discussed further below. It 
suffices to say here that this scheme could 
only work because of two principles that 
industry believed would never be invalidated. 
First, while foreign buyers were welcome to 
buy British, the Admiralty would never go 
abroad and would always call on the same 
small group of firms whose capabilities 
formed an impenetrable barrier to entry for 
rivals. Second, trust between the Admiralty 
and Britain’s warshipbuilding firms had been 
developed during both the naval arms race 
with Germany and the Great War, and the 
Admiralty was therefore not in the habit of 
inspecting the financial accounts of firms. 
Finally, the experience of disarmament was 
one of isolation – but for both industry and 
the Admiralty. Admittedly, this was a case 
of industry going ‘underground’ for reasons 
of necessity, for it is not hard to imagine the 
Treasury’s likely reaction if the scheme was 
uncovered. Secrecy was the key to success.
2. THE CHANGES THAT 
OCCURRED BOTH 
IN THE POLITICAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
THE ORGANISATIONAL 
STRUCTURES BETWEEN 
1932 AND 1935
Before 1931 the PSOC had been under-
worked by a government committed to 
disarmament in a world lacking in external 
threats. In September of that year, however, 
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria sparked 
a diplomatic incident which threatened 
British interests in the Far East. This brought 
questions of war preparedness and defensive 
deficiencies to the fore and transformed the 
role of the CID and its subordinates during 
peacetime. But, while the PSOC had devel-
oped its own relatively sophisticated set 
of committees, it still lacked the ability to 
remedy any industrial deficiencies identified 
without escalation to the executive body of 
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the CID and ultimately, Cabinet48. Indeed, 
the secret nature of the PSOC’s work meant 
that very few outside Whitehall even knew 
of its existence at all: formally approaching 
industry to discuss war preparations risked 
public alarm, as such it retained a low profile. 
For reasons outside the remit of this article, 
political and financial considerations around 
being seen to rearm – even if this was not 
strictly the same as preserving armaments 
manufacturing capacity – undermined the 
PSOC’s efforts to assist industry, and thus the 
cartel remained the best method of providing 
security for the private naval manufacturers.
The PSOC did, however, utilise industrial 
expertise to inform their investigations, and 
it is here where the paths between industry 
and government crossed once more. The 
committee structure and getting approval 
from Cabinet meant progress which was 
often painfully slow. But, from late 1933, 
Lithgow, Weir, and the steelmaker Sir Arthur 
Balfour, all with shipbuilding and armament 
interests, were invited into the PSOC as an 
‘Advisory Panel of Industrialists’, and had 
begun preparing secret reports on methods 
of speeding up armaments manufacture in 
an emergency in early 193449. Between that 
point and 1939, this trio of industrialists – 
and Weir in particular – would go on to do 
some extremely important work behind the 
scenes in organising and preparing British 
industry for war50.
Again, the machinations of the various 
subcommittees and industrial involvement 
within them do not specifically concern this 
48 ‘Organisation for the Coordination of War Supply’, PSO(SB)570, February 1936, TNA, CAB60/15.
49 Memorandum by Lord Weir, Sir James Lithgow and Sir Arthur Balfour’, PSO 415, 20 February 1934, TNA, 
CAB60/14, p. 1.
50 N. Forbes, “Democracy at a Disadvantage? British Rearmament, the Shadow Factory Scheme and the Coming 
of War 1936-40”, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vol. 55, n° 2, November 2014, p. 49-69.
51 N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Volume 1: Rearmament Policy, London, H.M.S.O., 1976, p. 80.
52 J. M. Reid, James Lithgow Master of Work, London, Hutchinson, 1964, p. 131; ’Deeds of Covenant, 1930’, 
National Maritime Museum [NMM], NSS.
53 ‘Deeds of Covenant, 1930’, National Maritime Museum [NMM], NSS.
54 A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding, op. cit., p. 98-101. Passenger berths were a mixture of the two: ocean-going 
liners were primarily constructed in warship berths, with smaller vessels in merchant berths.
account. The sum of their investigations 
was that British defensive capabilities had 
been seriously eroded since the Armistice, 
and what had ended the war as a large and 
young fleet with a huge defence industry was 
in 1934 old, obsolete, and short of both skills 
and modern facilities51. This said, Lithgow’s 
involvement is certainly worthy of note, for 
since 1930 he had headed a parallel ship-
building rationalisation body, the National 
Shipbuilder’s Security (NSS) scheme52. 
Broadly speaking, the NSS sought to liqui-
date uncompetitive shipyards on a voluntary 
basis, thereby removing willing participants 
from the pool of available shipbuilding 
capacity. Backed by the Bank of England, 
Lithgow’s scheme picked off shipyards 
one-by-one, purchasing entire companies 
(or the shipbuilding element of them), or, if 
that was impossible, sites and berths within 
the larger company. As an added measure 
to prevent the reactivation of facilities at the 
first sign of an improvement in the market, 
the NSS dismantled the great majority of 
what they purchased, and made it a condi-
tion of any future onwards sale that the land 
could not be used for shipbuilding for at least 
40 years53.
The NSS aimed to liquidate one third of 
capacity, though in such a way that it was 
spread evenly across the merchant, passenger 
and naval sectors. This was estimated at 
around 50 warship berths, and around 120 
major merchant berths, equivalent to the 
elimination of 1,3m tons of annual capacity54. 
Initially, progress was swift. Beardmore, once 
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the fourth biggest shipbuilder in Britain and 
one of only two major naval gun-mounting 
sites in the country, was the first sale to 
Lithgow’s scheme. Two of Palmer’s naval 
yards, one of Vickers-Armstrong’s, and 
Fairfield followed by 1935, thereby slimming 
down the sector. After this point, however, 
the sale of warship yards stopped entirely. 
Indeed, by the time the scheme had finished 
in 1938, only 37 of the desired 50 warship 
berths had been sold – despite a meeting with 
warship builders to entice them to sell55 – 
while 179 berths, equivalent to 1,1m tons or 
40 % of capacity, had been removed from the 
merchant pool56.
Space does not allow for a thorough 
investigation of the NSS or Lithgow’s 
policies. However, one can already see the 
inherent contradictions on at least two levels 
here. One is that the PSOC’s investigations 
into defensive deficiencies ran counter to 
Lithgow’s scheme to eradicate capacity, even 
if those yards were struggling badly with a 
lack of naval orders. Perhaps recognising 
this, from 1934 Lithgow’s policy shifted 
notably; naval yard purchases stopped, and 
those already sold were mothballed rather 
than liquidated. Lithgow himself even ended 
up owning the remnants of Beardmore and 
Fairfield in what could, and arguably should, 
be thought of as something akin to insider 
trading on secret government information.
Secondly, the yards themselves were 
reluctant to sell-up as readily as their 
merchant counterparts, despite the position 
in the early 1930s being, if anything, worse 
for naval builders. This should not have been 
the case. Firms involved in the manufac-
ture of cargo vessels were likely to have a 
diverse customer base and smaller overheads 
than those which derived a large propor-
tion of their income from naval contracts57. 
55 ‘Meeting of Warship and Liner Builders’, 23 February 1933, NMM, NSS.
56 A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding, op. cit., Table 4.9.
57 Ibid, Table 4.7.
58 ‘Minutes of Meeting’, 31 July 1930, NMM, NSS.
One explanation for this imbalance is the 
existence and operation of the cartel. As a 
mechanism for avoiding cutthroat compe-
tition and for raising prices, the committee 
allowed the warship sector more scope to 
mitigate the impact of market forces in a 
way that smaller merchant builders could 
not. Had a similar scheme existed within 
British merchant shipbuilding, clients could 
simply have gone abroad to purchase ships 
instead. Moreover, the long-term nature of 
disarmament had led the naval manufacturers 
to create and develop structures to deal with 
excessive competition some years before the 
onset of the global economic crisis, and while 
they could compete for merchant work, the 
reverse was not true for merchant builders. 
One could therefore argue that the WSBC’s 
success in raising the price floor for the rela-
tively few naval orders acted as a disincentive 
for its members to sell to the NSS, given that 
typical prices offered under the scheme were 
just half the pre-war value of a firm58.
In sum, there was no coherent State 
response to the problems of industry during 
disarmament. The Treasury (and Cabinet) 
viewed assistance in narrow terms: the 
way to preserve technology and skills was 
by ordering warships, which neither was 
prepared to do. Allowing the PSOC to inves-
tigate defensive deficiencies after Manchuria 
effectively kicked the question into the 
long grass: the subcommittees fretted and 
consulted and reported, but short of stopping 
the NSS before it could make a persuasive 
case to buy naval yards, it could achieve little 
to remedy deficiencies before 1935. Amidst 
this lack of coherence, and with each oper-
ating under veils of secrecy, the response of 
the naval arms industry was to persist with its 
cartel, and to secure increased profit margins 
when circumstances allowed.
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3. THE RESULTS OF PRICE 
FIXING AND THE FAILURE 
OF EFFECTIVE SUPPLY 
PLANNING DURING THE 
PERIOD OF REARMAMENT 
BETWEEN 1936 AND THE 
EARLY YEARS OF THE WAR
For the navy, rearmament was a relatively 
late phenomenon in Britain. The restrictions 
of the Washington Treaty were updated 
twice, in London, in 1930 and 1935. These 
finally expired on 31 December 1936, though 
new orders were placed during the year in 
anticipation of the treaty expiring, with 
construction beginning 1 January 1937. In 
so doing, the naval budget for 1936-1937 
was raised to £81m, before reaching £102m 
and then £132m in the following two years59. 
Given that the average budget from 1922-
1935 had been less than £55m, much of 
which was reserved for overheads and staff 
costs, this served as a very significant boost 
to construction60.
The pressures of such a late rearmament 
did, however, cause undesirable side effects. 
Industry was not fully equipped to deal with 
a large upturn in demand, especially in the 
notorious bottleneck areas around skilled 
labour, armour plate, and gun making61. As 
a result, industry, concerned that rearma-
ment would be a short phenomenon, needed 
financial incentives from the Treasury to 
expand facilities. Lithgow, for instance, 
had assumed control of Beardmore, and 
the Admiralty desired that it should double 
59 R.P. Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties, op. cit., p. 297.
60 Derived from R.P. Shay, British Rearmament in the Thirties, op. cit., p. 297, and B.R. Mitchell, British Historical 
Statistics, op. cit.
61 ‘Minutes of 36th Meeting of DPR’, DPR/36th Mtg, 18 March 1937, TNA, CAB4/27.
62 J. Hume and M. Moss, Beardmore: The History of a Scottish Industrial Giant, London, Heinemann, 1979, p. 238.
63 ‘Conditions for the extension of armour plant’, December 1936, GUAS: UGD 100/1/16.
64 A. Grant, Steel and Ships: The History of John Brown’s, London, Michael Joseph, 1950, p. 85.
its capacity for armour plate to 9 000 tons. 
In addition, the howitzer plant and steel 
foundries were re-opened, all at a cost to the 
Treasury of £143 580 by the end of 193662. 
Moreover, Lithgow rejected the Treasury’s 
stipulation that if it met the cost of expanding 
Beardmore, the new plant could only be used 
for government work. He demanded, and 
received, permission to use it for any orders 
Beardmore was able to secure63. There was 
a similar situation at John Brown; here it 
was Admiralty who pushed through similar 
terms for the expansion of the Atlas armour 
works, again paid for by the Treasury64. After 
being denied funding for so long, money was 
being thrown at the problem at almost the 
last minute.
The increased frequency of orders never-
theless allowed for the Warshipbuilders 
Committee to look much further forward 
when planning their expanded rotas. In the 
case of the 1936 agreement for destroyers, it 
is worth quoting the first four clauses in full:
1. The Rota shall be continued until 
completion of the round that is in progress 
on 31st March, 1940.
2. During the four years ending 31st 
March, 1940, Denny, Thornycroft, White 
and Yarrow shall all receive orders for 
an average of two destroyers per annum, 
either British or First-Class foreign, and 
they undertake to accept such foreign 
orders if required to do so by the Rota 
arrangements.
3. Vickers-Armstrong, Cammell Laird 
and John Brown will each forfeit their 
next turn in the Rota, following their 
Argentine orders.
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4. The current enquiry will be left for 
Denny, Thornycroft, White and Yarrow 
to deal with as they mutually arrange, and 
any order obtained will not be included 
in the Rota arrangement. The remai-
ning firms will refrain from any further 
competition on this enquiry65.
Thus, firms were to receive more classes 
of certain types of ship than others, relative to 
their size, capacity and areas of expertise. The 
builders that specialised in smaller vessels 
(listed in clause two) would receive more 
orders to compensate for the firms listed in 
clause three likely receiving the orders for 
the much larger battleships. Perhaps most 
importantly, the clauses in the rota suggest 
complete and unchallenged authority in the 
decisions of the committee. With the excep-
tion of a provision in certain circumstances 
(usually if one yard was unusually busy) 
for firms to swap contracts with each other, 
the rota was centrally decided, final and 
non-negotiable.
The committee’s other great strength 
appears to have been its ability to procure 
information from the Admiralty on future 
orders. Barr, in a document pertaining to 
tenders for capital ships, reported to all 
tendering firms that:
It is understood that it is not the desire of 
the Admiralty that they [Harland and Wolff] 
should build capital ships… According 
to the latest confidential information, the 
programme of capital ships, aircraft carriers, 
cruisers and destroyers to be placed between 
now and March 1940 is as follows…66
65 ‘Destroyer Rota Arrangements – SECRET’’, 9 October 1936, GUAS, GD319 12/7/6.
66 ‘Points for Discussion at a Meeting of Firms Capable of Building Capital Ships’, 18 September 1936, GUAS, 
GD319 12/7/6.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 H. Peebles, Warshipbuilding, op. cit., p. 148.
70 ‘Memorandum on conditions now existing in the shipbuilding industry’, Shipbuilding Conference Confidential 
Report, December 1938, GUAS, UCS 1/9/79.
The list then went on to detail, by year, 
how many ships and of what class and type 
the Admiralty would order. While the name 
of the source was not revealed, Barr knew, 
for example, that there would be five 8 000 
ton and two 5 000 ton cruisers in 1937-1938, 
and there would be nine Tribal-class and nine 
‘I-class’ destroyers the following year67. The 
document also had an “assumption” that the 
Royal Dockyards would not build capital 
ships or aircraft carriers, but would build 
some of the cruisers, which allowed them to 
“attempt to draw up an allocation of work”68. 
To have this level of detail, even accounting 
for the more regular orders that were placed 
from 1936, shows a well-developed system 
of collecting intelligence from the Admiralty 
and using it to share contracts between the 
member firms. Once more, the behaviour of 
the Admiralty and the WSBC in the war itself 
(see below), where the former clamped down 
on profiteering while the latter desperately 
tried to cover its tracks, suggests strongly that 
this was a one-way relationship.
The spate of new contracts awarded in 
1937 and 1938 allowed the WSBC to close 
in on full capacity for the first time in over 
fifteen years69. Illustrative of the nature of 
private shipbuilding was that demand for 
naval ships was supplemented by a rebound 
in global trade. The new merchant orders 
created meant prosperity returned as quickly 
as it had disappeared in 1922. Demand for 
material (in particular armoured steel) 
and skilled labour rocketed, causing both 
wages and prices to rise by anything up to 
15 %70.This was more than passed on to the 
Admiralty. While the price of a typical tramp 
steamer increased by around 15 % (broadly 
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in line with cost and overhead increases) 
in 1937, profit margins on Admiralty work 
doubled to more than 30 %71.This was three 
times higher than the typical margins on 
naval contracts before 1936, which them-
selves were still far better than merchant 
orders in the same years, or the losses 
incurred on Admiralty contracts before the 
formation of the WSBC.
It was not until the war itself that this 
practice was finally eradicated. Despite the 
National Government’s outward commit-
ment to prevent profiteering, the systems 
in place were woefully inefficient in 1939. 
The National Defence Contribution – a 5 % 
tax on all profits – barely dented margins on 
Admiralty vessels, while the later Armaments 
Profits Duty – a 60 % tax – was only in 
use for four months in 1939 before being 
replaced72. During this time, the Admiralty 
satisfied itself with crude price comparisons 
on Royal Dockyard-built ships as a check for 
value. However, since these maintained staff 
and facilities even in the absence of work, 
they were always far more expensive. As 
such, for the entire period from 1926 until 
1940, the WSBC was not effectively audited 
by the Admiralty or Treasury.
The earliest indication that the Admiralty 
intended to investigate profiteering was in 
November 1940, with E.C. Jubb querying the 
overhead charges at John Brown’s Glasgow 
yard. Brown claimed that the “disturbance 
of work owing to the necessity of transfer-
ring workman to emergency work [i.e. war 
contracts]” necessitated extra charges in the 
tender. The Admiralty believed that owing 
to Brown’s “current large output” and high 
levels of staff, the 40 % increase in over-
heads should have been much lower73. By 
71 H. Peebles, Warshipbuilding, op. cit., p. 140-142.
72 N. Rollings, “Whitehall and the Control of Prices and Profits in a Major War, 1919-39”, Historical Journal, 44 
(II), June 2001, p. 530-531.
73 See Jubb’s quotation above.
74 ‘Admiralty Contracts’ 17 July 1936, CUL, MS Templewood Part 9 File 5.
the following February, it had written to 
all WSBC firms noting that in light of the 
“very considerable expenditure of public 
money now being incurred on the building 
of warships” the firms would have an 
accountant visit to undertake investigations 
into the costs of construction74. This was the 
point when scrutinising contracts became far 
more robust.
The WSBC’s communication structure 
meant its members were frequently able 
to keep abreast of developments. In April 
1941, J. A. Milne of White wrote to Crease 
to circulate to the details of the Admiralty 
accountant’s visit to White’s yard. He 
outlined the contracts which were being 
investigated, the duration of his stay, and 
the files he requested to see. Milne noted 
the accountant “confined himself to asking 
for half a dozen invoices…[and], finding a 
satisfactory system of internal check in oper-
ation, made no detailed investigation of the 
figures in the Cost Ledger”. Tellingly, he 
then reported that as the “cost and financial 
accounts reconciled” then it was “probable 
that the fact that this was possible had some 
influence in his decision to make no detailed 
investigation of the actual costs” and that 
“he made no enquiry into the selling price 
or make up of the tender”. Finally, Milne 
expressed his concern over the Admiralty 
finding out about the WSBC’s ‘special fund’ 
which the members had been adding to the 
last peacetime orders to assist merchant 
builders or to help win foreign warship work, 
totalling £1500 per ship on the contracts the 
accountant had seen. Milne believed that 
if the “special fund were disclosed… and 
the Admiralty asked for explanations, the 
Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation should 
furnish a general statement on the subject, 
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rather than leave the individual Warship 
Group firms to evolve the explanations”75. 
In other words, Milne knew he had a lot 
to hide, and knew White was fortunate the 
Admiralty accountant had failed to uncover 
the true nature of its dealings.
The visit evoked panicked responses 
from the other firms. Crease had understood 
that the investigations would not involve 
ships started during peacetime, but now 
feared these would be treated as war profits 
and the results would “have a very disturbing 
effect throughout the Admiralty”. Moreover, 
he believed that “there is very little chance 
that knowledge of the results would be 
confined to the Admiralty” and as such 
believed that they would “come before the 
Select Committee on National Expenditure 
and thus to the Treasury and Parliament”76. 
His chief concern was “whether any action 
can be taken by the firms to improve the situ-
ation as it now exists” and “for firms, where 
necessary, to amend their tenders in the light 
of experience that has now been gained of 
their costs under war conditions”77. He there-
fore raised the idea of offering some form 
of rebate to the Admiralty – probably the 
clearest sign yet of guilt – though this was 
rejected by member firms on the grounds that 
such a scheme “may be construed as being 
done solely due to the results ascertained 
from the cost investigation”78.
Cammell Laird’s suggestion was to 
open up the books of all ships going back to 
Washington to the Admiralty, with the hope 
being that the lower profits – and indeed 
losses – in the 1920s and early 1930s would 
offset the later gains made in rearmament79. 
75 Milne to Crease, 5 April 1941, GUAS, UCS1/21/17.
76 Crease to ‘All Warship Group Firms’, 18 August 1941, GUAS, UCS1/21/18.
77 Ibid.
78 Piggot Notes, 20 August 1941, GUAS, UCS1/21/18.
79 Johnston to Crease, 11 September 1941, GUAS, UCS1/21/18.
80 Crease to Committee, 17 September 1941, GUAS, UCS1/21/18.
81 Johnston to Crease, 11 September 1941.
Its chairman noted that the average profit 
on all ships since 1922 was a much more 
modest 12,5 %, particularly because of 
losses incurred on earlier orders80. This time 
Crease rejected the idea believing such an 
invitation for the period since 1923 would 
include amongst other things all the arrange-
ments for pools [rotas], which persisted in the 
case of smaller ships, all the arrangements 
for the York-class cruisers in 1937, and the 
business with the purchase of the Dalmuir 
rights in 1934 and 1935. The possibility that 
any of these matters might be disclosed as 
the result of carrying back the investigations 
would give me great uneasiness, and the 
result might well be to increase our present 
difficulties81.
As a result, while it was believed that a 
scheme to get the Admiralty to investigate 
ships that yielded lower profits was desirable, 
this was not the way to go about it.
In October, the Admiralty – while not 
threatening to go to parliament (presumably 
through the embarrassment it would also 
cause itself) – did ask for more detail of how 
costs were calculated, and provided notifica-
tions to firms for the ships they proposed to 
investigate. Here, the committee attempted to 
push the Admiralty towards ships with lower 
profit yields. In the case of Harland and Wolff, 
the aircraft carrier Formidable was selected, 
and Crease asked other firms whether any 
benefit would result from investigation 
of Illustrious, Victorious or Indomitable [the 
other three ships of the same class in other 
yards] which are also available. It must be 
observed that the Admiralty stated that we 
must not select or nominate individual ships. 
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We could therefore only ask that another 
carrier be investigated82.
This was clearly linked to Crease’s earlier 
suggestions and underscores the WSBC’s 
fear of the Admiralty’s reaction if it uncov-
ered abnormally high results. The same was 
true for the Hunt-class destroyers. Crease 
believed that “we might ask for the 3rd and 4th 
groups to be investigated” for these “would 
show considerably reduced profits”. He noted 
that with profits of 35,4 % and 33,7 % respec-
tively, “none of [the first and second] group 
figures are very helpful to our case”. In an 
update the following week, he reported that 
he “gathered the results on Formidable will 
not cause embarrassment, but I am doubtful 
about the other items”83. In sum, that it took 
a major war with substantially tightened 
rules to uncover systematic overcharging is 
a damning indictment of both the duplicity 
in the industry and the Admiralty’s faith in 
its system.
By the end of the following year the 
Admiralty had got a much firmer grip on 
prices. In 1942 Swan Hunter won a contract 
for a floating dock valued at £150 000, and 
had the cost investigated. They were offered 
a 6 % profit – a vastly reduced sum – to which 
Swan Hunter protested and asked for 10 %. 
The final settlement was 7 %84. Writing to 
John Brown, Swan Hunter’s chairman noted 
despondently that “it was rather a struggle, 
and I am afraid you may not be able to get 
any settlement at a higher figure, especially in 
light of their present attitude”85. There never 
was any parliamentary enquiry that forced a 
rebate for the profits generated in the war, nor 
was there a full enquiry into tendering going 
back throughout the years of disarmament. 
While this was probably some consolation 
82 Crease to ‘All Warship Group Firms’, 13 October 1941, GUAS, UCS1/21/18.
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85 Ibid.
86 N. Rollings, “Whitehall and the Control”, art. cit., p. 524.
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to private industry, it was nevertheless clear 
that the era of the cartel was over.
CONCLUSION
We will probably never know the full 
extent of this cartel’s work, primarily 
because so little survives. Intriguingly, a 
large portion of what remains is badly fire 
damaged, and contains evidence of corre-
spondence and paper-trails with other yards 
of which no trace now exists. Despite this, we 
can still question why the Admiralty failed to 
notice a scheme like this sooner. It retained 
the right to inspect the financial records of 
the firms, after all. In practice however they 
trusted both the firms and their own tendering 
processes, and thus did not take up this option 
at any point during 1926-1940. Moreover, 
while the CID had convened a ‘contracts 
coordinating committee’ that existed “to 
secure economy and eliminate the forcing up 
of prices by competition” since the 1920s, it 
was concerned about precisely the opposite 
effect, (namely a war causing inter-service 
rivalry for resources and thus industry selling 
to the highest bidder), and as such was not an 
effective check on WSBC tenders86. In short, 
none of the systems in place offered adequate 
safeguards against profiteering.
The reasons for the cartel’s formation 
and continued existence owed as much to the 
politics of the CID and National Government 
as it did with slack Admiralty practices87. 
Before rearmament, the failure to adequately 
assist the naval arms industry forced firms to 
collude. Once rearmament began there was 
a desire within the CID and the Treasury to 
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maintain the ‘status quo’ as much as possible. 
Anything that unduly upset or hindered 
progress was feared and both emphasised the 
importance of the full and willing coopera-
tion of industry88. As such, any unduly close 
scrutiny or control was rejected outright, 
while the Government informed the public 
that “to put difficulties in the way of indus-
trial enterprise is to place on its shoulders 
a great responsibility”89. In short, the lack 
of progress and denial of funds before 1935 
coupled with the worsening international 
situation thereafter convinced policymakers 
that making more obstacles for the rearma-
ment drive – which they believed still had 
to be delicately balanced between security 
needs and the normal business activity of 
the country – was to be avoided at all costs. 
It was the combination of these factors with 
excessive Admiralty trust in industry that 
allowed the WSBC to continue for so long.
This said, one can conclude by suggesting 
this cartel may even have been good for 
rearmament. For one can readily imagine 
an alternative timeline: racing to the bottom 
88 N. Rollings, “Whitehall and the Control”, art. cit., p.532.
89 G. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939, Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1979, p. 83.
with cutthroat competition, the 1920s erad-
icated all but the strongest two or three 
naval armament manufacturers in Britain. 
Perhaps Vickers-Armstrong would have 
survived, but not much besides. The bottle-
necks in labour would only have worsened; 
the spreading round of orders allowed more 
employees around the country to gain at 
least some experience of naval work, rather 
than a small number having a great deal. 
Similarly, steel and guns at Beardmore, facil-
ities at Fairfield and elsewhere, would have 
certainly disappeared entirely. Instead, they 
were saved through a combination of a cartel 
which raised the price ‘floor’ to guarantee 
profits, Lithgow, and the PSOC’s foresight 
in changing a liquidation policy into one of 
mothballing and preservation. While the 
costs of extra profits against the spending in 
subsidies and assistance that were rejected 
in the 1920s are impossible to calculate, it is 
nevertheless ironic that the Warshipbuilders’ 
Committee saved the government from itself 
before rearmament, and that it got its money 
from the Treasury one way or another.
N5057-EH-85-1e.indd   87 26/01/2017   18:25
